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INTRODUCTION
Acts of the British Parliament that delegate rulemaking power com-
monly provide for some sort of parliamentary control over the exercise of
that power. For a number of years Americans have taken an interest in this
system of legislative control of administrative rulemaking, or "delegated
legislation" as it is termed in Britain. In 1941 the British system was
unenthusiastically mentioned in the report of the U.S. Attorney General's
Committee on Administrative Procedure,' and in 1955 two companion law
review articles discussed the British approach, one by Sir Cecil Carr
describing it2 and the other by Professor Bernard Schwartz commending it
as a model for the United States.
3
At a time when the United States is beginning to make increased use of
control of rules by legislative veto,4 another glance across the Atlantic
seems appropriate. There are several reasons for reexamining the British
system. First, Britain now has much more experience with the legislative
veto than it had in 1955, and since 1970 several parliamentary reports con-
taining detailed studies of the system have been published.5 Second, the
1. ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMM. ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE, ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE IN GOVERNMENT AGENCIES, S. Doc. No. 8, 77th Cong., Ist Sess. (1941).
2. Carr, Legislative Control ofAdministrative Rules and Regulations: Pariamentary Super.
vision in Britain, 30 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1045 (1955).
3. Schwartz, Legislative Control of Administrative Rules and Regulations: The American
Experience, 30 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1031 (1955); see text accompanying note 155 infra.
4. See Bruff & Gellhorn, Congressional Control of Administrative Regulation." A Study of
Legislative Vetoes, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1369, 1370-71 (1977); Javits & Klein, Congressional Over-,
sight and the Legislative Veto: A ConstitutionalAnalysis, 52 N.Y.U. L. REV. 455 (1977). Many
bills and amendments to bills concerning the delegation of legislative power have been consid-
ered by Congress. Representative Elliott Levitas has introduced many of them. See, e.g., H.R.
12048, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 122 CONG. REC. H10666-90, H10718-19 (1976). See also H.R.
REP. 'No. 94-1014, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976); Congressional Review of Administrative
Rulemaking: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Law and Government Relations
of the House Comm. on the Judiciary on H.R. 3658 and HR. 8231, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. (1975)
[hereinafter cited as House Hearings]; Improving Congressional Oversight of Federal Regulatory
Agencies Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Government Operations on S. 2258, S, 2716, S
2812, S 2878, S 2903, S 2923, S 3318 and S 3428, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976) [hereinafter
cited as Senate Hearings]. Many states have provisions for legislative review of administrative
rules: Professor Schwartz lists 28 states that have some sort of legislative review. Schwartz, The
Legislative Veto andthe Constitution-A Reexamination, 46 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 351, 362 n.90
(1978).
5. See, e.g., JOINT COMM. ON DELEGATED LEGISLATION, REPORT, H.L. 184, H.C. 475
(1971-72) [hereinafter cited as H.C. 475]; JOINT COMM. ON STATUTORY INSTRUMENTS, FIRST
SPECIAL REPORT, H.L. 76, H.C. 184 (1972-73) [hereinafter cited as H.C. 184]; JOINT COMM. ON
DELEGATED LEGISLATION, FIRST REPORT, H.L. 188, H.C. 407 (1972-73) [hereinafter cited as
H.C. 407]; JOINT COMM. ON DELEGATED LEGISLATION, SECOND REPORT, H.L. 204, H.C. 468
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procedures for control have been modified several times since 1955. The
most significant change has been the establishment of a joint committee of
both Houses of Parliament to scrutinize British rules. The need to scruti-
nize rules made by the various institutions of the European Economic Com-
munity (EEC) is also important, although this Article will not specifically
consider this new form of scrutiny.6 Finally, it is now possible, as a result
of studies such as the one by Professors Harold Bruff and Ernest Gellhorn, 7
to make direct comparisons with existing U.S. legislative vetoes and to ex-
amine whether the British experience has any general implications for the
United States.
This Article will describe and evaluate the British system of legislative
control of administrative rulemaking and will consider its utility as a model
for the United States. I have taken to heart Professor L.L. Jaffe's warning
that "one must tread warily in a foreign land when he has brought his find-
ing instruments from home," and opinions on the position of the United
States are expressed with caution. The Article consists of four sections: a
summary of the differences in the constitutional and administrative posi-
tions of the two countries, a description of the British system of legislative
control of rulemaking, an evaluation of that system, and finally, considera-
tion of the relevance of the British model to the United States.
I
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN U.S. AND BRITISH LEGAL
SYSTEMS
A. CONSTITUTIONAL RESTRICTIONS
In Britain, there is no written constitution and no separation of powers
doctrine. 9 Parliament is in theory sovereign, but in fact the executive
(1972-73) [hereinafter cited as H.C. 468]; SELECT COMM. ON PROCEDURE, FIRST REPORT, H.C.
588 (1977-78) [hereinafter cited as H.C. 5881.
6. See generally Bates, The Scrutiny ofEuropean Secondary Legislation at Westminster, 1
EUR. L. REv. 22 (1976). On the difficulties involved, particularly in the case of British rules
implementing EEC obligations, see JOINT COMM. ON STATUTORY INSTRUMENTS, FIRST SPE-
CIAL REPORT, H.L. 51, H.C. 169 (1977-78) [hereinafter cited as H.C. 169]. In a letter to The
Times (London), May 9, 1978, at 19, col. 4, Lord Greenwood of Rossendale pointed out that
the British House of Lords is usually more efficient in considering EEC rules than the Euro-
pean Parliament at Strasbourg.
7. Bruff & Gellhorn, supra note 4.
8. Jaffe, English Administrative Law--A Reply to Professor Davis, 1962 PUB. L. 407, 416.
9. S. DE SMITH, CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW ch. 2 (3d ed. 1977). See
generally Griffith, The Constitutional Signfcance of Delegated Legislation in England, 48
MICH. L. REv. 1079, 1083-92, 1116-20 (1949); G. MARSHALL, CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 97-
124 (1971); B. SCHWARTZ & H.W.R. WADE, LEGAL CONTROL OF GOVERNMENT 11-18 (1972);
E.C.S. WADE & G. PHILLIPS, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW chs. 2-4 (9th ed. A. Bradley 1977).
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dominates the legislature through a strong party system. Nevertheless, the
doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty means that there is no legal impedi-
ment to the extent to which the legislature may control the executive and
administrative agencies. Control can never be said to be unconstitutional,
leaving only practical and conventional limits upon Parliament's control. 10
In the United States, by contrast, the constitutionality of legislative
control is less clear. Although the legislative veto "was neither specifically
discussed by the Framers nor clearly banned by the Constitution,""II the
doctrine of separation of powers 12 implicitly limits the power of Congress
to interfere with the exercise of presidential power. 13 The doctrine also re-
stricts the power of Congress to delegate legislative power, although this
limitation has been undermined by judicial acceptance of very broad statu-
tory standards.' 4 Many critics of congressional control of administrative
rulemaking have argued that such control is unconstitutional.' 5 President
Carter, for instance, has asserted that
[s]uch intrusive devices infringe on the Executive's constitutional duty to
faithfully execute the laws. They also authorize Congressional action that
has the effect of legislation while denying the President the opportunity to
exercise his veto. Legislative vetoes thereby circumvent the President's role
in the legislative process established by Article I, Section 7 of the Constitu-
tion. '
6
As British practice can throw no light on the constitutionality in the United
States of the various forms of legislative veto,' 7 the following discussion
will deal only with the practical efficacy of legislative control.
10. See E.C.S. WADE & G. PHILLIPS, supra note 9, at 16-26, 48-50; S. DE SMITH, sUpra
note 9, at 44-62, 90-93 (general discussion of conventions). See also notes 70-72 infra and
accompanying text (suggesting that there are serious practical limits to the effectiveness of
legislative control).1 1. Watson, Congress Steps Out: A Look at Congressional Control of the Executive, 63
CAL. L. REv. 983, 1087 (1975).
12. See Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313 (1934); Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168,
190-91 (1880); C. ANTIEAU, 2 MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 11:13-:22 (1969).
13. 2 C. ANTIEAU, supra note 12, § 11:17.
14. Id § 11:21; see, e.g., Tagg Bros. & Moorhead v. United States, 280 U.S. 420 (1930)
('Just and reasonable" a sufficient standard); New York Cent. Sec. Corp. v. United States, 287
U.S. 12 (1932) (public convenience, interest, or necessity a sufficient standard).
15. See Senate Hearings, supra note 4, at 76, 124-31 (testimony of Antonin Scalia, Ass't
Attorney General, U.S. Dep't of Justice); note 17 infra.
16. President's Message to the Congress on Legislative Vetoes, 14 WEEKLY COMP. OF
PRES. Doc. 1146, 1147 (June 21, 1978).
17. Much has been written on the constitutional questions. See Abourezk, The Congres.
sional Veto: A Contemporary Response to Executive Encroachment on Legislative Prerogatives,
52 IND. L.J. 323 (1977); Ginnane, The ControlofFederalAdministration by Congressional Reso-
lutions and Committees, 66 HARV. L. REv. 569 (1953); Javits & Klein, supra note 4; Miller &
Knapp, The Congressional Veto: Preserving the Constitutional Framework, 52 IND. L.J. 367
(1977); Schwartz, supra note 4; Stewart, Constitutionality ofthe Legislative Veto, 13 HARV. J.
LEOIs. 593 (1976); Watson, supra note 11.
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B. JUDICIAL REVIEW
The role and scope of judicial review of executive or department action
differ sharply in the two countries. In the United States a reviewing court
decides all questions of law' 8 and determines questions of fact under the
substantial evidence rule, which permits administrative action to be set
aside where it is unsupported by "such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support [the] conclusion."' 19 In Britain,
on the other hand, the scope of review is narrower than in the United States
in that, with one exception, it is limited to cases of excess or abuse of juris-
diction.20 In practice, however, the scope of review has been broadened by
a greater willingness to characterize questions as ones of law2l and by the
improvement of techniques for controlling abuse of discretion.22
The contrast between the broad scope of judicial review in the United
States and the narrower scope in Britain is particularly significant because
in Britain, in the absence of express statutory provisions, there is no re-
quirement similar to that in the United States23 mandating compliance with
18. Administrative Procedure Act, § 10(e), 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1976).
19. Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938). See also Consolo v.
Federal Maritime Comin'n, 383 U.S. 607, 608-21 "(1966); 4 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
TREATISE §§ 29.01-.11 (1958); L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION
595-623 (1965).
20. B. SCHWARTZ & H.W.R. WADE, supra note 9, at 209-16; S. DE SMITH, JUDICIAL RE-
VIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 111-12,353-61 (3d ed. 1973). This is largely a result of the
doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty, see notes 9-10 supra and accompanying text, for once it
is established that administrative action is authorized by Parliament the courts may not inter-
vene. It is, however, a cardinal axiom that every statutory power has its limits, regardless of
the breadth of the language of the statute, and any administrative action that goes beyond
those limits is subject to control by the courts. According to H.W.R. Wade, "The technique by
which the courts have constructed their system for the judicial control of powers has been by
stretching the doctrine of ultra vires .... [Tihey can make the doctrine mean almost anything
they wish by finding implied limitations in Acts of Parliament...." H.W.R. WADE, ADMIN-
ISTRATIVE LAW 42 (4th ed. 1977). The exception is error of law on the face of the record.
21. Compare Edwards v. Bairstow, [1956] A.C. 14 (the issue whether a transaction
amounted to "trade" was a question of law where the facts were undisputed), and Coleen
Properties Ltd. v. Minister of Hous. and Local Gov't, [1971] 1 W.L.R. 433 (C.A.) (minister's
decision that was not based on any evidence supporting it was error of law), and Regina v.
Medical Appeal Tribunal, [19571 1 Q.B. 574 (C.A.) with Shields v. Utah Idaho Cent. R.R., 305
U.S. 177 (1938) (facts were undisputed but the determination was nevertheless one of fact),
and NLRB v. Marcus Trucking Co., 286 F.2d 583 (2d Cir. 1961). British courts also have a
tendency, where errors of law are made, to interpret jurisdiction very narrowly, e.g., Anisminic
Ltd. v. Foreign Compensation Comn'n, [1969] 2 A.C. 147, 171.
22. E.g., Padfield v. Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, [1968] A.C. 997, 1006
(ministers are not at liberty to act arbitrarily or capriciously); Laker Airways Ltd. v. Depart-
ment of Trade, [1977] 1 Q.B. 643 (C.A.); Congreve v. Home Office, [1976] 1 Q.B. 629 (C.A.).
23. The Administrative Procedure Act, § 4, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1976), requires that rule-
making be undertaken only after notice and an opportunity for the public to comment on a
proposed rule.
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procedural safeguards before promulgating a rule. 24 In practice, many Brit-
ish statutes provide for consultation, and where they do not, administrators
tend to consult interested organizations voluntarily.25 But the nature and
extent of this consultation vary widely, and individual members of the pub-
lic are rarely consulted. Moreover, in the absence of an express rulemaking
power, administrators may be inhibited from establishing their policies by
rules because they are barred from "fettering" their discretion-although
this prohibition has recently come under attack from both judges and com-
mentators.26 The consequence of this unstructured approach to the
rulemaking process at the promulgation stage is a greater need for other
avenues of control, whether or not they are in fact the most effective.
C. ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEMS
In the United States administration is conducted both by executive
agencies, such as the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, and by
independent regulatory agencies, such as the Federal Trade Commission.
In Britain most administration is conducted by the executive, i e., by gov-
emnment departments that are ultimately controlled by ministers.27 The
contrast is important because party discipline and the fact that ministers are
members of Parliament give the executive effective control of the legisla-
ture.
24. See Bates v. Lord Hailsham, [1972] 1 W.L.R. 1373 (Ch.); H.W.R. WADE, supra note
20, at 716-17, 723-28. Britain formerly had such a requirement in the Rules Publication Act,
1893, 56 & 57 Vict., c. 66, which provided for a limited form of consultation. This Act was
repealed by the Statutory Instruments Act, 1946, 9 & 10 Geo. 6, c. 36. J. KERSELL, PARLIA-
MENTARY SUPERVISION OF DELEGATED LEGISLATION 6-8 (1960); 415 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th
ser.) 1096, 1111-13 (1945); notes 43-45 infra and accompanying text.
25. See Agricultural, Horticultural and Forestry Indus. Training Bd. v. Aylesbury Mush-
rooms Ltd., [1972] 1 W.L.R. 190 (Q.B.); H.C. 475, supra note 5, at 204-05 app. 9; Garner,
Consultation In Subordinate Legislation, 1964 PUB. L. 105; Jergesen, The Legal Requirements of
Consultation, 1978 PUB. L. 290; H.W.R. WADE, supra note 20, at 718, 728-31. See also H.C.
475, supra note 5, at 196-202 app. 8.
26. See British Oxygen Co. v. Minister of Technology, [1971] A.C. 610; H.T.V. Ltd. v.
Price Comm'n, [1976] I.C.R. 170; Galligan, The Nature and Function of Polices Within Discre-
tionary Power, 1976 PUB. L. 332. Courts and commentators in the United States generally
encourage administrative agencies to formulate policy through rulemaking procedure, but rec-
ognize that an agency has discretion to choose case-by-case adjudication over rulemaking.
See, e.g., Fook Hong Mak v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 435 F.2d 728 (2d Cir.
1970); K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT 143-46 (3d ed. 1972). Bruff & Gellhorn, supra
note 4, at 1375; Williams, Securing Fairness and Regularity in Administrative Proceedings, 29
AD. L. REV. 1, 12-13 (1977). Some courts have gone further and held that rulemaking rather
than adjudication should have been employed in a particular case. NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon
Co., 394 U.S. 759 (1969); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584
(D.C. Cir. 1971).
27. There are exceptions. See, e.g., W. ROBSON, NATIONALIZED INDUSTRY AND PUBLIC
OWNERSHIP 25 (2d ed. 1962); Baldwin, A British Independent Regulatory Agency and the "Sky-
train" Decision, 1978 Pua. L. 57, 70-71.
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Although this difference has been overlooked by some commenta-
tors,28 it may be significant. For instance, there is little danger in Britain of
a veto leading to undue dominance by the legislature or to reluctance on the
part of administrators to take controversial but necessary steps in rulemak-
ing, as some commentators have suggested happens in the United States.29
Indeed, the most recent Report from the Select Committee on Procedure
suggests that the legislature is in a very weak position as compared to the
executive. It stated that "the balance of advantage between Parliament and
the Government in the day to day working of the Constitution is now
weighted in favour of the Government to a degree which causes widespread
anxiety and is inimical to the proper working of our parliamentary democ-
racy." 30
II
A DESCRIPTION OF THE BRITISH SYSTEM
A. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
The existence of rulemaking powers and requirements that rules be
presented to--or "laid before"--Parliament can be traced to the eighteenth
century.31 But it was not until the late nineteenth century that widespread
delegation of legislative power necessitated some form of control.32 In 1893
the Rules Publication Act33 was enacted to systematize the publication and
review of rules that were subject to a laying requirement. The Act provided
for advance publicity to facilitate the submission of comments on proposed
rules. It also provided for the subsequent publication of statutory rules by
requiring that they be numbered, printed, and sold by the Queen's
printer.34 The Act was not, however, comprehensive: it did not apply to all
rules and its requirements could be evaded merely by calling a rule a "pro-
visional order."35 Moreover, even where the Act did apply, antecedent
publication was not a condition precedent to the enforceability of a rule and
thus did not ensure examination by the legislature.
The amount of delegated legislation has greatly increased over the last
28. Eg., Schwartz, supra note 3.
29. See Watson, supra note 11, at 1081; Bruff & Gellhorn, supra note 4, at 1422.
30. H.C. 588, supra note 5, at viii.
31. C. Payshan, The American Legislative Veto and its British and Constitutional Back-
ground ch. 3 (1977) (unpublished thesis in Bodleian Law Library, Oxford University).
32. H.W.R. WADE, supra note 20, at 697-98.
33. 1893, 56 & 57 Vict., c. 66.
34. Id § 3(1); H.W.R. WADE, supra note 20, at 723.
35. COMM. ON MINISTERS' PowERs (DONOUGHMORE COMMITTEE), REPORT, CMD. No.
4060 at 44-48, 66 (1931-32) [hereinafter cited as CMD. No. 4060]; H.W.R. WADE, supra note
20, at 723.
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eighty years. The reasons for this are generally said to be the development
of the "welfare state" and the need for very broad emergency powers dur-
ing the two World Wars.36 The first move toward legislative control came
in 1924 when a House of Lords select committee (the Special Orders Com-
mittee) was established to consider rules requiring an affirmative vote of
approval in Parliament before becoming effective.37 The continued growth
in the amount of delegated legislation and the fear that government by ex-
ecutive dictat was becoming a real threat led to the establishment of the
Committee on Ministers' Powers (the Donoughmore Committee) to con-
duct an inquiry. The committee's report, 38 published in 1932, recom-
mended that each House of Parliament have a small standing committee to
report on all proposed legislation conferring rulemaking powers on a minis-
ter, and further to report on all rules laid before that House. 39 Eventually
this recommendation led to the establishment of the House of Commons
Statutory Instruments Committee (the Scrutiny Committee) in 1944.40 The
House of Lords simply retained its Special Orders Committee.
The Scrutiny Committee's terms of reference extended to consideration
of the drafting and scope of a rule, but not to its merits.41 Thus, the distinc-
tion between technical scrutiny and scrutiny of the merits came into exist-
ence, a distinction that still dominates the British system of legislative
control today. The distinction is made on the assumption that the most
effective scrutiny of technical adequacy will occur in a nonpartisan, judicial
atmosphere and that this is only possible by avoiding the controversy inher-
ent in any consideration of the merits and policy behind individual rules. 42
The Donoughmore Committee's recommendations were also instru-
mental in bringing about the repeal and replacement of the Rules Publica-
tion Act with the Statutory Instruments Act, 1946.4 3 The Statutory
36. H.W.R. WADE, supra note 20, at 698.
37. See House of Lords Standing Order No. 216(l), reprinted in H.C. 475, supra note 5, at
xii, para. 10. See also H.C. 475, supra note 5, at xviii-xx, paras. 32-45.
38. CMD. No. 4060, supra note 35.
39. Id at 62-64.
40. The workings of this committee have been described by Sir Cecil Carr. See Carr,
supra note 2.
41. The Select Committee was to consider questions such as clarity, effect, ultra vires, and
retroactivity-4o ensure that rulemakers did not go beyond the authority conferred on them by
the parent act, and that they adhered to any conditions or specifications therein. The commit-
tee's jurisdiction is discussed in H.C. 475, supra note 5.
42. CMD. No. 4060, supra note 35, at 69; 400 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 258-63 (1944).
See also H.C. 475, supra note 5, Minutes of Evidence, at 49-50, 108, 124; J. KERSELL, supra
note 24, at 49-50. Arguably the committee's original jurisdiction did not even permit it to
consider the merits of a rule as an exercise of the power delegated. See note 130 infra and
accompanying text.
43. 9 & 10 Geo. 6, ch. 36; see 415 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 1096 (1945); C. ALLEN, LAW
AND ORDERS (3d ed. 1965).
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Instruments Act applies to a much broader range of rules than did the
Rules Publication Act; in fact, the more recent Act introduced the term
"statutory instrument" to cover the many different types of delegated legis-
lation to which it applied.44 Unfortunately, however, the Statutory Instru-
ments Act did not retain the earlier law's requirements of advance
publication and consideration of written comments.45
Shortly after these Donoughmore Committee recommendations were
implemented a serious controversy arose over the difficulty in securing time
on the floor of the House of Commons both to debate the merits of dele-
gated legislation and to consider the reports of the Scrutiny Committee.
The adoption of the "11:30 rule" in 195346 prohibiting debate on rules after
11:30 p.m. further limited the time for debate and merely worsened the situ-
ation, although some restriction was necessary to curb obstructionist tactics
by the opposition in bringing prayers to annul rules.47
B. RECENT REFORMS
By 1971, the time problem that had originally surfaced several years
earlier had become so serious that the House of Commons Select Commit-
tee on Procedure stated that the lack of time for the House to consider re-
ports of the Scrutiny Committee materially reduced the practical usefulness
of technical scrutiny.48 The Select Committee went on to make several rec-
ommendations, the following of which have been implemented: (1) the
merits of some rules should be considered in committee rather than on the
floor of the House, (2) the terms of reference of the Scrutiny Committee
should be extended, and (3) a committee of both Houses should inquire into
44. Section I(i) of the Act defines "statutory instrument" to include three categories of
"delegated legislation" or "administrative rules" made or approved under statute: (1) Orders
in Council; (2) ministerial powers stated in a statute to be exercisable by statutory instrument;
and (3) rules made under a statute to which the Rules Publication Act applied. See H.C. 588,
supra note 5, ch. 3, para. 1. The terms "rule," "instrument," and "delegated legislation" are
used interchangeably in this Article. It should be noted, however, that many administrative
rules are not statutory. British examples of such rules are extrastatutory tax concessions, see 60
LAW Q. REv. 125, 218 (1944), and the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board, see, e.g., Regina
v. Criminal Injuries Compensation Bd., [1967] 2 Q.B. 864.
45. J. KERSELL, supra note 24, at 8.
46. See SELECT COMM. ON DELEGATED LEGISLATION, REPORT, H.C. 310-I, at xxxii, para.
107 (1952-53) [hereinafter cited as H.C. 310-1]. The committee recommended that rules not be
considered after 11:30 p.m. and that the period of time in which a negative resolution could be
brought be extended by 10 days from the report of the Scrutiny Committee, if necessary. Only
the first proposal was adopted.
47. Carr, supra note 2, at 1051-53; see H.C. 475, supra note 5, at xv, xxxiii-xxxvi, paras. 21,
97-109.
48. SELECT COMM. ON PROCEDURE, SECOND REPORT, H.C. 538, at xxii, para. 42 (1970-71)
[hereinafter cited as H.C. 538].
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the whole question of legislative control and report on how to improve pro-
cedures.4 9
Pursuant to this last recommendation of the Select Committee, the
oint Committee on Delegated Legislation was set up to report on legisla-
tive control. In 1972 this Joint Committee recommended the formation of a
joint scrutiny committee with jurisdiction over all but a very small number
of rules. The old system of conducting technical scrutiny separately in each
House had led to extensive duplication of effort and to anomalous differ-
ences in jurisdiction.50 This system was therefore abandoned in 1973 with
the establishment of the Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments (Joint
Scrutiny Committee), which now examines all general rules whether or not
laid.51 It can draw the attention of Parliament to a rule on several specified
grounds, including "any ground which does not impinge on its merits or on
the policy behind it."52 The most common of the specific grounds for refer-
ral are "unusual or unexpected use of powers," including ultra vires,53 de-
fective drafting, and the need for elucidation.54
The Joint Committee on Delegated Legislation also recommended in
1972 that a new standing committee be established to review and report to
Parliament on the merits of rules.55 The Joint Committee hoped that such
49. The committee also recommended that once the Scrutiny Committee draws the atten-
tion of the House to any rule subject to the negative procedure, the rule should, unless debated
within the 40-day period, become subject to the affirmative procedure. Id at xxii, para. 43.
This proposal has not been adopted.
50. H.C. 475, supra note 5, at xviii-xxiii, xxvi-xxvii, paras. 32-54, 67. The House of Lords
committee did not scrutinize negative or general instruments at all. The House of Commons
committee confined itself to statutory instruments. It neither considered rules subject to the
affirmative procedure that were Special Orders, id at xii, paras. 10- 11, nor gave the right to
petition against Special Orders in the nature of private or hybrid bills, id at xix-xx, xxvii,
paras. 40-42, 67; H.C. 407, supra note 5, at xx-xxxix, paras. 35-105 (hybrid instruments).
51. See 850 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 1217 (1973). The House of Commons Select Com-
mittee is still in existence and meets weekly to consider instruments laid only before that
House-mainly financial matters which constitutionally and conventionally are subject to the
exclusive control of the Commons. Since the establishment of the Joint Scrutiny Committee,
the Select Committee has considered 556 instruments, or an average of 1 I I per session. H.C.
169, supra note 6, para. 2. Its jurisdiction is the same as that of the Joint Committee, see note
52 infra and accompanying text.
52. These grounds are set out in H.C. 475, supra note 5, at xxi-xxii, para. 50. See also
notes 106-21 infra and accompanying text.
53. H.W.R. WADE, supra note 20, at 736. The committee pays particular attention to sub-
delegation where it is not expressly authorized, and to the question of whether onerous re-
quirements imposed under a power expressed in general terms are reasonable and within the
scope of the act. H.C. 475, supra note 5, at xxii-xxiii, para. 53. The Joint Committee has
recently sharply criticized the omission of detail in instruments and wide discretionary powers
in enabling acts. H.C. 169, supra note 6, paras. 9-12.
54. H.C. 475, supra note 5, at xxii-xxiii, paras. 53-54. See also C. ALLEN, supra note 43, at
139; J. GRIFFITH & H. STREET, PRINCIPLES OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 90-92 (5th ed. 1973).
55. H.C. 475, supra note 5, at xxxvi-xl, paras. 110-128. See also H.C. 538, supra note 48;
853 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 680 (1973).
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a standing committee would alleviate the problems of securing time for de-
bate on the floor of the House. This proposal has also been implemented,
with the establishment of a standing committee (the Merits Committee) in
1973.56 Consideration of the merits of rules is thus no longer restricted
solely to the floor of the House, although the separation of technical scru-
tiny from scrutiny of merits still exists. In fact, the Joint Committee on
Delegated Legislation recommended that the separation should be "rigidly
maintained."5 7
These successive reforms in parliamentary control of administrative
rulemaking were necessitated by the continued ineffectiveness of the sys-
tem. In many respects the establishment of the House of Commons Scru-
tiny Committee in 1946 was the major innovation, although its narrow
terms of reference and the difficulty in securing time on the floor of the
House of Commons to consider its reports or to debate the merits of rules
led to the more recent reforms.
C. CONTROL PROCEDURE
1 Methods of Control
Although there is no constitutional requirement for legislative control
of administrative rulemaking,58 acts delegating legislative powers usually
contain a provision directing that rules be laid before one or both Houses of
Parliament. There are many different methods of control procedure that
Parliament can choose from in exercising its power to review rules laid
before it. The majority of rules are laid once they are in force, but some are
laid in draft.5 9 Some rules are subject to no precondition to effectiveness
56. The Merits Committee may consider statutory instruments requiring affirmative reso-
lutions, and those subject to negative resolutions where there is a motion of a minister for
annulment before the House-provided that 20 members do not object. Proposals to change
this rule have been made by the Select Committee on Procedure. See H.C. 588, supra note 5,
paras. 10-18. See also notes 101-05 infra and accompanying text.
57. H.C. 475, supra note 5, at xviii, para. 30. See also H.C. 588, supra note 5, ch. 3, paras.
12-13.
58. In fact, numerically the class of rules not subject to any control is large. J. KERSELL,
supra note 24, at 14-20; H.C. 475, supra note 5, Minutes of Evidence, at 52 (testimony of R.D.
Barlas, Second Clerk Assistant of the House of Commons); H.C. 468, supra note 5, at x, paras.
30-31.
59. Only about 10% are laid in draft. H.C. 475, supra note 5, at 193 app. 7. See also C.
ALLEN, supra note 43, at 123; J. GRIFFITH & H. STREET, supra note 54, at 84-85. Drafts are
more commonly laid where control is by affirmative resolution. H.C. 468, supra note 5, at vi,
viii, paras. 9, 17; H.C. 169, supra note 6, paras. 19-20. In the United States it appears that
review of rules already in force is constitutionally more questionable than review of drafts of
rules because of the obstacle imposed by the presentation clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 3;
see Atkins v. United States, 556 F.2d 1028, 1064-65 (CL Cl. 1977); Abourezk, supra note 17, at
336; Watson, supra note 11, at 1071-73. The majority in Atkins was of the opinion that a one-
house legislative veto did not violate the principle of bicameralism because the veto's effect
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beyond being laid before Parliament.60 The laying requirement by itself,
therefore, cannot really be considered a legislative veto.
Most rules are subject not only to a laying requirement but also to
annulment. Annulment 6' is effected by one of two basic procedures: (1) a
negative procedure, under which a rule becomes automatically effective un-
less rejected by a resolution of either or both Houses of Parliament within
forty sitting days, or (2) an affirmative procedure, under which a rule's ef-
fectiveness lapses unless specifically approved by resolution.62 The nega-
tive procedure is used in approximately 66% of general rules, while the
affirmative procedure is used in approximately 12%.63 About 22% are sub-
ject to no control beyond a laying requirement."
2. Choosing Among Methods of Control
Despite the availability of several types of control procedure, Parlia-
was not to make law but to preserve the status quo. Also, based on a comparison of the
experience of the Office of Education and the Federal Energy Administration, it appears that
legislative control may be more effective if rules are laid in draft. Bruff& Gellhorn, supra note
4, at 1386, 1395-97, 1411.
60. Professor Schwartz did not consider this type of rule. Schwartz, supra note 3, at 1038.
Many of them-about half of the 2,000 statutory instruments registered each year-are local in
their operation. H.C. 475, supra note 5, at xi-xii, paras. 6-7. The Joint Committee, however,
has considered rules only subject to a laying requirement (an average of 64 per session) and
those that are not required to be laid (an average of 279 per session) where they are general in
their operation. H.C. 588, supra note 5, at xxxi.
61. Section 5 of the Statutory Instruments Act provides for annulment by Order in Coun-
cil, so the appropriate motion that a regulation be annulled is a prayer to the Crown.
62. H.C. 475, supra note 5, at xiii, para. 12. The following are examples of rules that are
(I) subject to a negative resolution, and (2) subject to an affirmative resolution. There are
other types of negative and affirmative resolutions, see note 63 infra, but these two are the most
common:
(I) Section 7 of the Poisons Act, 1972, c. 66, empowers the Secretary of State, after consul-
tation with or on the recommendation of the Poisons Board, to make rules with respect inter
alia to the sale, storage, transport, and labeling of poisons. Section 10(1) of the Act states:
"Any power to make orders or rules under this Act shall be exercisable by statutory instru-
ment, which shall be subject to annulment in pursuance of a resolution of either House of
Parliament."
(2) Section 273(7) of the Town and Country Planning (Scotland) Act, 1972, ch. 52, pro-
vides: "Any order under this Act which designates an area for the purposes of section 72(4) of
this Act [requiring "office development permits"] shall cease to have effect at the end of the
period of twenty-eight days beginning with the day on which the order is made. . . unless
before the end of that period the order is approved by a resolution of each House of Parlia-
ment."
63. Including rules laid in draft, there are at least five standard methods by which rules
are submitted to Parliament: (1) by being laid after making; (2) by being laid in draft subject to
a negative resolution; (3) by being laid after making and subject to negative resolution; (4) by
being laid in draft and approved before making; (5) by being laid after making and having a
limited duration if not approved. H.C. 475, supra note 5, at 193-94 app. 7 (memorandum by
First Parliamentary Counsel). See also H.C. 468, supra note 5, at vi-viii, paras. 8-15.
64. These figures have been compiled from the information in H.C. 468, supra note 5, at
vi-vii, paras. 8-11, 14; id, Minutes of Evidence, at 10 app. 1, 14-15, 41, 66 app. 2.
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ment has failed to develop any rational criteria for determining which pro-
cedure is appropriate in making a particular delegation of rulemaking
power.65 This is particularly true in choosing between the negative proce-
dure and the "laying only" procedure. The failure to develop criteria has
been justified on the ground that "[r]ules for the settlement of questions
such as this, which must arise in circumstances of infinite variety, are noth-
ing but an embarrassment, tending to encumber the task of arriving at the
right answer in any particular case." 66 On the other hand, the absence of
criteria means that when granting rulemaking power, Parliament is hin-
dered from making a considered choice of the means by which it is to exer-
cise control over such power in any given situation. 67 Consequently, the
political judgment of the minister whose rules are to be scrutinized tends to
prevail. 68
The Joint Committee on Delegated Legislation has recently recom-
mended that the affirmative procedure should normally be employed for
rules that substantially affect the provisions of primary legislation, impose
or increase taxation, or involve considerations of special importance-such
as the creation of new varieties of criminal offenses. The committee recom-
mended use of the negative procedure for other cases in which Parliament
wishes to retain some control. It rejected the argument that "skeleton"
powers, which are broad delegations of power by Parliament leaving broad
discretion in formulating administrative rules, should always be controlled
by the affirmative procedure. 69 It is too early, however, to evaluate the im-
pact of these tentative criteria on legislative control.
3. The Timing of Control
Parliamentary control is ex post facto in that administrators have al-
ready drafted the rules and decided upon the policies embodied in them
before Parliament scrutinizes them. This leads to control being relatively
weak because, as a general rule, it is more difficult to persuade administra-
65. See H.C. 468, supra note 5, at xi-xvi, paras. 34-54; id, Minutes of Evidence passim.
See also H.C. 475, supra note 5, Minutes of Evidence, at 98-100, 102, 106-07, 109, 126, 133,
153-54; id at 194-95 app. 8; C. ALLEN, supra note 43, at 129-32; J. KERSELL, supra note 24, at
16-20, 83-85.
66. H.C. 310-I, supra note 46, at 31-32 (memorandum by Sir Alan Ellis). This is still the
official view. H.C. 468, supra note 5, at xi, para. 35; H.C. 475, supra note 5, at 194 app. 8, para.
2.
67. H.C. 468, supra note 5, at xii, paras. 38-39; C. ALLEN, supra note 43, at 129-32.
68. C. ALLEN, supra note 43, at 129; H.C. 3 10-I, supra note 46, Minutes of Evidence, at 61,
146.
69. H.C. 468, supra note 5, at xiv, para. 46.
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tors to change views already formed than to influence initial policy
choices. 70
The weakness of parliamentary control of rulemaking is not necessar-
ily bad. After all, the purpose of delegating legislation is to relieve Parlia-
ment of some of the burdens of legislative government. If the only way for
Parliament to control rulemaking is by legislative procedures, much of the
point of delegation is lost.71 But parliamentary control is even more inef-
fectual than it might otherwise be because several factors impede Members
of Parliament from getting information early enough for effective control.
Since the repeal of the Rules Publication Act in 1946,72 rules are no longer
published in advance of their being laid. At the formulative stage of
rulemaking there is very little consultation between administrators and
Members of Parliament qua Members.73 In addition, until very recently no
legislative committee existed to consider the merits of a rule; such consider-
ation was left to the floor of the House to be brought up, if at all, by indi-
vidual Members of Parliament.
4. The House of Lords Rarely Exercises Control
Although in theory both Houses of Parliament are equally involved in
control, as far as non-EEC rules are concerned only the House of Commons
70. The same is true in the United States. Compare the legislative veto of rulemaking in
the General Education. Provisions Act, § 431, 20 U.S.C. § 1232(d) (1976), with the experience
of Congress with the Federal Energy Administration. Bruff and Gellhom, supra note 4, at
1396, state that
[flor its part, the FEA did not engage in the detailed negotiation over the substance of
proposed rules that typified HEW's practice, perhaps because of the diminished role of
the committee process. Instead, the FEA ordinarily tried to diffuse political opposition
in advance by the substance or timing of its proposals. It then lobbied Congress from
a relatively fixed position.
Compare the U.K.'s attitude toward control of rulemaking by the EEC, where the emphasis is
placed on early scrutiny procedures. See SELECT COMM. ON EUROPEAN COMMUNITY SECON-
DARY LEGISLATION, SECOND REPORT, H.C. 463-I, at xvi-xxii, paras. 53-80 (1972-73); SELECT
COMM. ON EUROPEAN SECONDARY LEGISLATION, & C., TWENTY-EIGHTH REPORT, H.C. 45-
XXVIII (1974-75); Bates, supra note 6, at 24-25, 36-37.
71. H.C. 588, supra note 5, ch. 3, paras. 2-4; W. GELLHORN & C. BYSE, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW 127 (6th ed. 1974); Newman & Keaton, Congress and the Faithful Execution of
Laws-Should Legislators SuperviseAdministraorsZ 41 CAL. L. REV. 565, 574-75 (1954).
72. This Act was found to be too inflexible, and a large proportion of enabling statutes
specifically excluded its application to them. The Act did not cover all rulemaking anyway,
and even when it did apply publication was not a condition precedent to the enforceability of
the rule. J. KERSELL, supra note 24, at 8; notes 33-35 supra and accompanying text.
73. Parliament does play a consultative role during the consideration of primary legisla-
tion, but even at this stage control is hampered by lack of information, lack of adequate re-
search and secretarial facilities, and by the party system. J. GRIFFITH, PARLIAMENTARY
SCRUTINY OF GOVERNMENT BILLS 232-57 (1974). For studies of facilities available to Mem-
bers of Parliament, see THE HOUSE OF COMMONS SERVICES AND FACILITIES (M. Rush & M.
Shaw eds. 1974); J. MORGAN, REINFORCING PARLIAMENT (PEP Broadsheet vol. XLII, no. 562,
1976). See also H.C. 588, supra note 5, paras. 6.34-.46.
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regularly exercises any control. The House of Lords has never annulled an
instrument subject to the negative procedure and only once has rejected an
instrument under the affirmative procedure;74 but the reasons for this lack
of participation of the Lords are not clear. One possible factor is that origi-
nally the Lords only scrutinized rules made under statutes relating to the
supply of utilities, which were in the nature of private legislation. 75 Other
reasons may include the fact that the House of Lords is not an elected
chamber, and that it is effectively excluded from considering financial legis-
lation.
III
SCRUTINY OF MERITS AND TECHNICAL SCRUTINY
The distinction between technical scrutiny and scrutiny of the merits,
mentioned above,7 6 is an essential part of the British system. As it plays no
part in American legislative vetoes, it is important to examine it and the
consequences of its use.
A. SCRUTINY OF MERITS
1. Shortage of Time for Debate
The effectiveness of scrutiny of rules continues to be hampered by the
shortage of time for debate on the floor of the House. The Joint Committee
on Delegated Legislation reported that in the 1970-71 session there were
forty-eight notices of prayer to annul statutory instruments that were sub-
ject to the negative procedure. Of these, thirty-one were not debated and
five were debated after the expiration of the period of annulment. 77 De-
74. H.C. 475, supra note 5, at xiii, para. 13. There is no difficulty finding time in the
House of Lords to debate these matters. From 1960 to 1972 only 14 negative resolutions were
moved-an average ofjust over one per session. Id. at xxx, xxxii, paras. 85, 91; id., Minutes of
Evidence, at 132.
75. This type of legislation relates to a particular locality or a particular person or
agency-e.g., British Rail, an individual, a local authority, or a corporation. The legislative
process has some of the attributes of a judicial proceeding; evidence is presented and the pro-
moters of the bill are represented by counsel. See E. MAY, THE LAW, PRIVILEGES, PROCEED-
INGS AND USAGE OF PARLIAMENT 840-1000 (18th ed. Sir B. Cocks 1971); E.C.S. WADE & G.
PHILLIPS, supra note 9, at 180-81, 358-60.
76. See notes 41-42 & 51-57 supra and accompanying text.
77. H.C. 475, supra note 5, at xxxii, para. 95; 1d., Minutes of Evidence, at 51; see id. at 62,
63, 134. An average of 500 negative instruments are laid each session, but 1970-71 was a busy
year: 765 were laid. The Scrutiny Committee considered 314 and 16 were debated (5% of those
considered, 2% of those laid), 11 within the annulment period (3.5% of those considered, 1% of
those laid). Id at 52, 134. The evidence taken by the committee established the following
points: (1) debate rarely occurs on technical issues because of the classification by the Whips of
instruments into "major" and "minor" categories, according to political importance, id at 43,
53, 55-56, 137-39, and because of the necessity in the case of technical scrutiny for the Scrutiny
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bates that take place outside the period in which an instrument can be an-
nulled appear to be only of cosmetic value, although they may be useful in
compelling administrators to explain their actions and to disclose informa-
tion.78 The lack of time for debate also affects consideration of instruments
subject to the affirmative procedure. Affirmative instruments are often ap-
proved without discussion and sometimes wholesale. Where debate does
occur it is rare to have more than two speakers, 79 which suggests that legis-
lative control does not facilitate the resolution of issues of policy left open
by primary legislation.80 It was thought that enabling some debates on
merits to be conducted in committee8 ' would improve the situation, but the
Merits Committee has no power to make recommendations8 2 and has not
been very effective.8 3 Debate on the floor of the House is most likely to
occur when the opposition party objects to a rule. It is least likely to occur
when the objection comes from government backbench M.P.'s.8 4 This is
because government Whips-or party managers-generally refuse to set
aside government time for such debates. Furthermore, the strength of the
party system makes it difficult to be disloyal, particularly on an issue that is
relatively unimportant.8 5  -
The time problem does not in fact stem from an increase in the number
of rules coming before Parliament, as this figure has remained fairly con-
stant since 1954.86 The problem is instead attributable to the fact that the
legislature has made less time available for debate8 7 and to the increased
size and complexity of individual rules.88 It also stems from inefficient use
Committee to consult the department before making an adverse report while time for annul-
ment is running out, see id at 148; (2) only serious technical defects are reported, id at 35, and
although normally the department gives a satisfactory explanation, often an assurance that the
point will be dealt with in the future suffices to prevent an adverse report because everyone
knows of the time problem, id at 37, 145; and (3) sometimes it is more difficult to get a debate
on a sensitive political issue due to government resistance, id at 53-54, 134.
78. H.C. 475, supra note 5, Minutes of Evidence, at 60; H.C. 169, supra note 6, paras. 21-
22; H.C. 588, supra note 5, ch. 3, para. 8; id, app. 22, paras. 26-31.
79. See H.C. 475, supra note 5, Minutes of Evidence, at 167-72 app. 3.
80. Exceptions to this are where politically controversial issues are embodied in adminis-
trative rules. For instance, a dock labor scheme promulgated pursuant to the Dock Work
Regulation Act, 1976, ch. 79, failed to get an affirmative resolution after debate of 90 minutes
with 12 M.P.'s speaking. See 954 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 1289-382 (1978).
81. See note 56 supra. i
82. See H.C. 475, supra note 5, Minutes of Evidence, at 113-14; H.C. 588, supra note 5,
paras. 10, 16; note 102 infra.
83. See notes 101-05 infra and accompanying text.
84. H.C. 475, supra note 5, Minutes of Evidence, at 43, 53, 72, 138-39.
85. Id, Minutes of Evidence, at 43.
86. Id. at 44, 52.
87. See, e.g., notes 46-47 supra and accompanying text.
88. In 1955 there were 3,240 pages for 2,007 rules while in 1974 there were 8,667 pages for
2,213 rules. H.C. 588, supra note 5, at x-xi; id, app. 1, paras. 19-36.
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of the time available. For instance, debates on the merits frequently take
place before an instrument has been subjected to technical scrutiny by the
Joint Committee. The fact that in the 1976-77 session twenty-four such de-
bates took place led the Joint Committee to describe the situation as mak-
ing "a farce of the appointment of a Scrutiny Committee," and
demonstrating the
lack of consideration shown to [the committee] and, more important, to the
House by those responsible for arranging the business of the House in failing,
in as many as 24 instances in a Session, to enquire about the progress of an
instrument through the Committee before bringing it on for debate.89
The Select Committee on Procedure has also been very critical of this
practice, and both it and the Joint Scrutiny Committee have recommended
the adoption of a requirement that no rule be considered by the House of
Commons until the Scrutiny Committee has reported on its technical ade-
quacy.90 In the case of rules subject to the negative procedure, the Select
Committee has further recommended that, if necessary, the brief period in
which annulment is possible should be extended to ensure that technical
scrutiny precedes debate on the floor of the House.91 These proposals have
not been acted upon. The nonimplementation of earlier proposals-the
first was in 1953-for extending the time for annulment under the negative
procedure, or for changing the method of control to the affirmative proce-
dure once the Scrutiny Committee issues an adverse report on a rule, sug-
gest that reform is unlikely.92 There is still force in the view expressed in
1941 by the U.S. Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Proce-
dure that the ineffectiveness of legislative control of rulemaking is attributa-
ble to "lack of desire rather than lack of opportunity, '93 although other
factors, such as the tight control over the business of the House of Com-
mons exercised by the executive, are also important.94
The difficulties caused by the shortness of time for annulment under
the negative procedure95 are increased by the absence of a requirement of
89. H.C. 169, supra note 6, paras. 21-22. At least two of these were later reported by the
Scrutiny Committee on the ground that they were ultra vires and were withdrawn.
90. This already exists in the House of Lords for rules subject to affirmative resolutions:
House of Lords Standing Order No. 68.
91. H.C. 169, supra note 6, paras. 21, 22; H.C. 588, supra note 5, paras. 10-18. See also
H.C. 475, supra note 5, at xxxiv, para. 102.
92. See, eg., H.C. 310-I, supra note 46, at xxvi, para. 98; H.C. 538, supra note 48, at xxii-
xxiii, para. 43 (recommendation 19). Even the Select Committee on Procedure, which was
very critical of existing procedures, felt unable to make a firm recommendation on this. H.C.
588, supra note 5, para. 14.93. ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE IN GOVERNMENT AGENCIES, supra note 1, at 120; H.C.
588, supra note 5, paras. 10-18.
94. See notes 27-30 & 84-85 supra and accompanying text.
95. The 40 "sitting days" within which negative instruments must be annulled may in
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prepromulgation consultation with M.P.'s. 96 It is noteworthy that a major
concern of the House of Commons committee responsible for scrutinizing
EEC secondary legislation has been to ensure that it has adequate notice of
rules before their promulgation. 97 In the case of non-EEC rules, the fact
that no such notice is given must weaken the effectiveness of legislative
control.
Critics have pressed for more time for debate on the floor of the House,
but in view of the increased amount of primary legislation being considered
this would be difficult. In an effort to provide more time for technical scru-
tiny, the government has agreed to try to defer the operation of some nega-
tive instruments for twenty-one days after laying.98 Twenty-one day
deferral would also give more time for consideration of the merits, but un-
fortunately it is not uniformly adhered to.99 This noncompliance, together
with the sharp resistance to proposals relating to instruments subject to the
negative procedure that sought either to extend the period for annulment
or-once the Joint Committee had drawn the attention of Parliament to a
rule-to change the method of control to the affirmative procedure, l°° sug-
gests that no real improvement is likely.
practice be as few as 28 working days of the parliamentary session. Attempts to extend the
period have failed. The Joint Committee on Delegated Legislation has stated that the question
of extending the 40-day period should be considered again after the effects of its other propos-
als and the 21-day rule have been assessed. H.C. 475, supra note 5, at xxv-xxvi, xxxiv, paras.
63, 102; H.C. 407, supra note 5, at xliii, paras. 121-22; H.C. 468, supra note 5, at ix, para. 25.
The committee did, however, suggest an amendment to the Statutory Instruments Act that
would enable Parliament to extend the period by resolution of both Houses. H.C. 407, supra
note 5, at xlv, para. 127. Cf. id at xliii-xliv, paras. 123-26 (arguments for and against ex-
tending the time period). As yet, this proposal has not been implemented.
96. See text accompanying note 70 supra.
97. SELECT COMM. ON EUROPEAN COMMUNITY SECONDARY LEGISLATION, FIRST RE-
PORT, H.C. 143 (1972-73) [hereinafter cited as H.C. 143]; H.C. 463-I, supra note 70; SELECT
COMM. ON EUROPEAN SECONDARY LEGISLATION & C., FIRST SPECIAL REPORT, H.C. 46 (1974-
75); Bates, supra note 6, at 30-35; H.C. 169, supra note 6, paras. 23-26, 28-36.
98. See H.C. 538, supra note 48, at xxiv, para. 48 (recommendation 22); 825 PARL. DEB.,
H.C. (5th ser.) 649-58 (1972); 325 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) 238 (1971); H.C. 475, supra note
5, at xxv, para. 62; id, Minutes of Evidence, at 197; H.C. 184, supra note 5.
99. The Joint Scrutiny Committee has reported that a high percentage of breaches are
attributable to the process of decisionmaking in the EEC, and are sometimes outside the im-
mediate control of the relevant British ministry. H.C. 169, supra note 6, paras. 13-16, 27.
100. See note 92 supra and accompanying text. These proposals were rejected in 1972,
apparently on the grounds that technical issues are not necessarily most appropriate for discus-
sion on the floor of the House, and that administrative problems would result if the date of
operation of an instrument were affected after its laying. H.C. 475, supra note 5, at xxvi, xxx,
paras. 65, 85; id, Minutes of Evidence, at I ll. The Joint Committee on Delegated Legislation
did recommend a system for ensuring some priority for instruments drawn to the attention of
the House by the Scrutiny Committee, H.C. 475, supra note 5, at xxxix, para. 125. See also
H.C. 407, supra note 5, at xliii, para. 123; H.C. 588, supra note 5, ch. 3 (reiteration of the
rejection of earlier proposals).
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2 Operation of the Merits Committee
It is still early to assess the impact of the Merits Committee, but the
Select Committee on Procedure has reported that it has several serious de-
fects. First, although the committee has alleviated pressure on the floor of
the House and has enabled more rules to be considered, it has increased the
difficulty for ordinary Members of Parliament to move motions of annul-
ment on the floor of the House. This is because ministers seek to refer rules
to the committee once a motion of annulment has been made. Once a rule
has been considered by the committee it can be brought to a vote on the
floor of the House without notice or debate. One consequence of this is that
rules subject to the negative procedure are now rarely considered on the
floor of the House.' 01 Second, membership on the committee is not popular
because Government Whips indiscriminately unload the routine business of
the House onto the committee. Since this business would take little time on
the floor of the House and is of little interest to Members, service on the
committee is seen as a waste of time. This feeling is reinforced by the in-
ability of the committee to take action on or even make recommendations
on 10 2 the instruments it reviews. There is little desire to serve on a commit-
tee that merely reports that it "has considered" a rule.
The Select Committee concluded that the Merits Committee is an "un-
satisfactory procedural device which has failed to meet the real needs of the
House."' 0 3 It has suggested that the committee should have the power to
make substantial recommendations and to recommend amendments to
rules subject to the affirmative procedure.' °4 It also suggested changes that,
101. H.C. 588, supra note 5, ch. 3, para. 10; id, app. 22, para. 23. This is despite the fact
that 20 M.P.'s have the power to block a reference to the committee, H.C. 475, supra note 5, at
xxxvi-xxxviii, paras. 110-23; H.C. 588, supra note 5, ch. 3, paras. 10-19; see note 56 supra. The
object, however, was to supplement, not to supplant, opportunities for debate on the floor of
the House. H.C. 475, supra note 5, at xl, paras. 127-28.
102. The committee only has the power to "take note" of a rule. H.C. 475, supra note 5, at
xxxvii, para. 116. This neutral report has failed to be passed on only six occasions since the
1974-75 session when the committee was established. Some 322 rules were referred to it in its
first three years of operation. H.C. 588, supra note 5, ch. 3, paras. 10, 15-16, 18; id, app. 22,
para. 22.
103. H.C. 588, supra note 5, ch. 3, para. 10; id, app. 22, para. 20.
104. In Britain there has never been power to amend rules. This is in contrast to some U.S.
state veto provisions. E.g.,CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 4-170 (1979); NEB. REV. STAT. § 84-904 (Cum.
Supp. 1978). An earlier but more limited proposal--to give power to amend technical de-
fects-was rejected. The proposal was made to get around the difficulty in finding time to
debate negative instruments, see notes 77-78 supra and accompanying text. The general argu-
ments against powers of amendment are that they (1) defeat the purpose of delegation by
increasing the workload of the legislature, and (2) could compromise the value of consulting
affected interests at the prepromulgation stage of rulemaking. H.C. 310-, supra note 46, Min-
utes of Evidence, at 10-167; H.C. 475, supra note 5, at xxxi, para. 88; H.C. 588, supra note 5, ch.
3, paras. 19-21; id, app. 22, paras. 26-28.
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if implemented, would enhance the influence of individual Members of
Parliament and facilitate debates on the merits.'0 5 Only time will tell
whether these recommendations will be implemented, and if they are,
whether they will improve matters significantly.
B. TECHNICAL SCRUTINY
Technical scrutiny is essentially a limited tool for control.' 0 6 The Joint
Scrutiny Committee clearly does have an important deterrent effect on ad-
ministrative malpractice because of the publicity it can generate. The com-
mittee has improved standards of drafting considerably and has persuaded
departments to avoid delay in laying rules before Parliament. 0 7 Its most
powerful weapon against a rule, however, is to refer the rule to the full
House. It can do no more. The inability of the committee to ensure that a
prayer for annulment will be brought or a debate will occur once it reports
adversely on a rule has already been discussed.'08 It is submitted that the
committee's weakness is partly due to the distinction between merits and
technical issues. Although not rigidly adhered to,109 the distinction means
that M.P.'s, who generally wish to debate merits and politically important
issues,1 10 do not have a report on the very issues that interest them.' This
105. These proposals include a longer maximum time for debating rules subject to the af-
firmative procedure (2 hours instead of 1 hours), consideration of such rules !that are
approved at the commencement of public business, and provision for a debate where a rule is
not approved or where approval is qualified. In the case of rules subject to the negative proce-
dure the Select Committee recommended that, where the Merits Committee recommends that
a rule be annulled, government time be allotted for a debate. If after seven days a debate has
not been held, any Member could claim precedence over all public business for one hour of
debate. H.C. 588, supra note 5, ch. 3, paras. 15-16.
106. See notes 41-42 supra and accompanying text; J. GRIFFITH & H. STREET, supra note
54, at 92. The limited nature of technical scrutiny is illustrated by the fact that the Joint
Scrutiny Committee has expressed reservations on whether it is the appropriate body to review
delegated legislation made during the continued period of direct rule in Northern Ireland. The
committee reasoned that since such legislation fulfills the function of primary legislation, often
adopting previously enacted British primary legislation, "the normal questions about vires,
purport and drafting are therefore inapplicable." H.C. 184, supra note 5, at 10, para. 12; see
H.C. 169, supra note 6, paras. 6-8. This function has now been taken away from the commit-
tee.
107. J. GRIFFITh & H. STREET, supra note 54, at 93-94; H.C. 588, supra note 5, para. 8.
108. See notes 77-100 supra and accompanying text.
109. See notes 123-31 infra and accompanying text.
110. J. KERSELL, supra note 24, at 49-50; Hanson, The Select Committee on Statutorylnstru.
ments 1944-1949, 1949 PuB. AD. 278, 281; Hanson, The Select Committee on Statutory Instru-
ments:.A Further Note, 1951 PUB. AD. 281, 282.
111. The fact that there is no requirement of prepromulgation consultation with Members
of Parliament makes this a particularly serious problem. See text accompanying note 96
supra. It is arguable that the issues that the Scrutiny Committee presently considers could best
be dealt with by rulemaking procedures such as those in the Administrative Procedure Act, 5
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can only reduce the influence of the Scrutiny Committee and explains why
debate on the floor of the House on technical issues is fairly uncommon.
Another weakness of technical scrutiny is that, although departments
normally cooperate fully in responding to technical criticism by the
Scrutiny Committee, they often do no more than assure the committee that
the point criticized will be dealt with in the future. The particular instru-
ment that attracted the criticism is thus left unaffected. The committee has
contented itself with such assurances because of its limited terms of refer-
ence and the difficulty in getting its reports debated on the House floor."12
Some departments have simply not followed the committee's recommenda-
tions to avoid certain drafting techniques,113 although this is rare. Profes-
sor H.W.R. Wade has stated that the importance of the committee's work is
that "it gives government departments a lively consciousness that critical
eyes are kept upon them. The fact that 2 per cent or less of the instruments
scrutinized are reported to the House is in part a measure of the Commit-
tee's success in establishing a standard."' 1 4 In view of the difficulty in en-
suring any further control once an adverse report has been made, the low
percentage of reports made to the House may in fact reflect the committee's
desire to maximize the likelihood of a debate on rules that have really seri-
ous defects. Mr. Albert Booth, M.P., a former chairman of the House
of Commons Scrutiny Committee, certainly adhered to this view." 15 The
situation could improve, however, if the Joint Committee on Delegated
Legislation's recommendation that priority in debate be given to instru-
ments reported to the House is adopted."16
These weaknesses do not, however, mean that technical scrutiny can
never be used as a broad tool for control. The Joint Scrutiny Committee
has criticized the "recurring tendency of Departments to seek to by-pass
Parliament" by omitting necessary details from instruments, thus conferring
upon themselves wide discretion to vary or add to the provisions of an in-
strument instead of making a new instrument that would itself be subject to
U.S.C. §§ 551-706 (1976); see United States v. Florida E. Coast Ry., 410 U.S. 224 (1973); text
accompanying notes 150-54 infra.
112. Recently the committee's terms of reference were extended, however, to include "any
... ground which does not impinge on [a rule's] merits or on the policy behind it." H.C. 475,
supra note 5, at xxiv, para. 59. For a discussion of the committee's jurisdiction, see notes 52-54
supra and accompanying text.
113. For instance, in 1974 the committee recommended that in drafting an order subject to
a financial limitation the instrument should indicate on its face that it does not exceed the
limitation. SELECT COMM. ON STATUTORY INSTRUMENTS, THIRD REPORT, H.C. 22-iii (1974-
75). But this was overlooked in drafting the Compensation for Limitation of Prices Order
(Northern Ireland) 1976, 1976 STAT. R. & 0. N.I. No. 1. H.C. 54-x (1975-76).
114. H.W.R. WADE, supra note 20, at 735.
115. H.C. 475, supra note 5, Minutes of Evidence, at 35, 37, 145.
116. See note 100 supra and accompanying text.
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parliamentary control."l 7 While recognizing that the need for executive
flexibility is one of the justifications for granting delegated powers in the
first place, the committee stated that the corollary of this "must be that the
delegated legislation itself should be detailed, specific and self-explanatory
and should not depend on the exercise of ministerial or departmental dis-
cretion unless provision to that effect is expressly contained in the enabling
Statute."" 8 The committee felt that rules should not be made by depart-
mental circular when Parliament had enacted a statute providing that they
were to be made by statutory instrument subject to further parliamentary
scrutiny.
Although in the past successive Joint Committees have accepted "ad-
ministrative inconvenience" as a reason for rejecting proposals for re-
form,' '9 the most recent Special Report from the Joint Scrutiny Committee
contains some of the sharpest criticism of the executive yet seen. The com-
mittee was disturbed "by what appears to be an astonishingly casual atti-
tude on the part of the Executive" toward the practice of laying rules before
Parliament in manuscript form without a printed version appearing until
well after the rule has become law. 120 This, the committee said, amounts
"on the face of it to a cynical disregard of the rights of the subject" to know
the law,' 21 and the strength of this language may foreshadow more vigor-
ous control by the legislature. The evidence of the past, however, does not
encourage optimism.
C. UTILITY OF THE DISTINCTION
The Joint Scrutiny Committee does not always adhere to the distinc-
tion between scrutiny of merits and technical scrutiny. Sir Cecil Carr ad-
mitted that the House of Commons Scrutiny Committee sometimes
"peep[ed] at the merits,"'122 and this is still the case. For instance, in the
evidence taken by the committee in relation to the Welfare Food Order
117. H.C. 169, supra note 6, paras. 9-12. The committee gave as an example the retention
of power to specify the amounts of certain educational grants. The amounts were specified by
regulation, but the regulation went on to give to the minister the power to set aside the
amounts specified and to substitute other grants. Although it is possible to delegate power to
amend acts of Parliament, H.W.R. WADE, supra note 20, at 700-01, such delegation requires
express authority.
118. H.C. 169, supra note 6, para. 12. For judicial disapproval of a similar practice, see
Laker Airways Ltd. v. Department of Trade, [1977] 1 Q.B. 643 (C.A.).
119. See notes 92 & 100 supra.
120. See H.W.R. WADE, supra note 20, at 725-28 (discussion of the effect of nonpublication
on validity). The better view is that nonpublication does not normally affect the validity of an
instrument. But see Lanham, Delegated Legislation and Publication, 37 MOD. L. REV. 510
(1974).
121. H.C. 169, supra note 6, paras. 17-18.
122. Carr, supra note 2, at 1055.
LEGISLATIVE CONTROL
1975123 and the Counter-Inflation (Price Code) (Amendment) Order
1976,124 some of the questions indicated the committee's concern with the
method chosen to protect consumers,12 5 which is surely an issue of policy.
This was particularly true in the case of the latter order, which was con-
cerned only with making lists of protected goods. The tendency to blur the
distinction is increased by the committee's custom of taking evidence from
outside bodies and its practice of giving reasons for reporting an instru-
ment.
The distinction is also breaking down in the context of control of Euro-
pean Community rules. The House of Lords Select Committee on the Eu-
ropean Communities considers the policy of a rule and whether its strategy
can be improved. 126 The House of Commons Committee on European
Secondary Legislation is only supposed to identify matters of legal or politi-
cal importance and not to consider merits.127 But the criteria of "impor-
tance" have been flexible enough to include indirect consideration of
merits. 128 The experience of this House of Commons committee and the
report of the Joint Committee on Delegated Legislation both suggest that
"merits" means political content, 129 but this is rather vague. In 1946 the
clerk of the House of Commons suggested that the Scrutiny Committee
should consider "the merits of an instrument as an exercise of the power
delegated,' 30 but at the time this was rejected. Although this test might
draw the committee into controversy, such power is vital, and indeed it ar-
guably falls within the heading "unusual or unexpected use of power" in
the committee's present terms of reference.'
3
'
As mentioned above, 13 2 the distinction between scrutiny of technical
defects and merits has reduced the influence of the Scrutiny Committee.
Because of the distinction, the committee tends to focus on those issues that
could best be dealt with by rulemaking procedures of the type provided for
123. 1975 STAT. INST. No. 1686.
124. 1976 STAT. INST. No. 71.
125. See JOINT COMM. ON STATUTORY INSTRUMENTS, THIRD REPORT, H.C. 54-iii (1975-
76); JOINT COMM. ON STATUTORY INSTRUMENTS, EIGHTH REPORT, H.C. 54-viii (1975-76);
JOINT COMM. ON STATUTORY INSTRUMENTS, NINTH REPORT, H.C. 54-ix (1975-76).
126. Bates, supra note 6, at 26 & n.26.
127. Id., at 26-27; H.C. 463-1, supra note 70; SELECT COMM. ON PROCEDURE, FIRST RE-
PORT, H.C. 294 (1974-75) [hereinafter cited as H.C. 294], Minutes of Evidence, at 44, para. 135.
128. Bates, supra note 6, at 27-28, 35-36.
129. H.C. 475, supra note 5, at xvii, para. 29.
130. SELECT COMM. ON PROCEDURE, THIRD REPORT, 189-I, Minutes of Evidence, at 353,
para. 39 (1945-46) (emphasis in original) [hereinafter cited as 189-I]; see J. KERSELL, supra
note 24, at 49-50.
131. See 189-I, supra note 130, at 250, para. 4669.
132. See notes 109-11 supra and accompanying text.
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in the United States by the Administrative Procedure Act. Technical issues
are of little concern to the politicians who, under the British system, ulti-
mately decide whether they are significant enough to warrant debate. The
fact that the distinction is not adhered to rigidly suggests that, apart from
insulating the Scrutiny Committee from some political pressure, it has no
real advantage.' 33
IV
LESSONS FROM THE BRITISH EXPERIENCE
The British system of legislative veto has proved less than satisfactory
in rendering administrators accountable to their political superiors and pro-
tecting those affected by administrative rules. This limited success stems
from many factors. These include de facto executive control of the legisla-
ture, the unavailability of information about the substance of a rule in the
time available for control, the limited time available for debate, and the
apparent unwillingness of Members of Parliament to take an interest in
scrutiny, especially of technical infirmities.
It could be argued that a general veto in the United States would be
free from these defects. Many of the administrative agencies are independ-
ent, the executive by no means controls Congress, members of Con-
gress-unlike Members of Parliament-have staffs available to research
issues, and Americans pay little attention to the distinction between "mer-
its" and "technical issues."' 134 Furthermore, in the United States rule-
making procedures under the Administrative Procedure Act are completed
before the veto stage is reached, bringing controversial issues into the open
by then. 135
These factors, coupled with the different constitutional position of the
United States, may persuade some that the British experience is not instruc-
tive in assessing the utility of the legislative veto in the United States. Con-
sideration should be given, however, to the fact that Congress would have
to deal with a far greater number of rules than the average of about 1,000
133. The Joint Committee on Delegated Legislation recommended that the distinction be
"rigidly maintained," see note 57 supra and accompanying text, but somewhat inconsistently
rejected a power to amend technical defects on the ground that distinguishing these from issues
of policy would be too difficult. H.C. 475, supra note 5, at xxxi, paras. 86-90.
134. See Schubert, Legislative Adudication of Administrative Legislation, 7 J. Pun. L. 135,
160-61 (1958); Newman & Keaton, supra note 71, at 572-73. The legislative veto over the
Department of Health, Education and Welfare's Office of Education is, however, limited to
inconsistency with the statutory authority. General Education Provisions Acts, § 431, 20
U.S.C. § 1232(d)(1) (1976).
135. See Bruff& Gellhorn, supra note 4, at 1389, 1412-14.
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per year considered by the British Scrutiny Committee. 136 This, together
with the fact that records produced under U.S. rulemaking procedures are
often extremely lengthy,1 37 suggests that a general veto could only provide
haphazard control in the United States.138 If this is the case, the British
experience is of some value because it demonstrates what can happen when
an overburdened legislature takes on a task of this kind. Together with the
experience of U.S. state legislatures that have attempted to operate a gen-
eral veto provision,139 Britain's experience suggests that the overall impact
of a general legislative veto is unlikely to beneficial.
The Bruff and Gellhorn study shows that a significant constraint on the
thoroughness of legislative control is the heavy workload of Congressmen
and their staffs.140 In Britain there is evidence that it is difficult to persuade
Members of Parliament to sit on new committees because of their work-
load. 141 The problems in the two countries would appear to be similar in
this respect. Arguably the introduction of a general veto in the United
States could divert attention from other legislative techniques of control
available to Congress-for instance, control by oversight committees,142
watchdog committees, investigations, or limited expenditures. 43 It is also
important to note that Parliament does not have as sophisticated a commit-
tee system as Congress has. 144 The need for direct legislative scrutiny of
administrative rules may therefore be greater in Britain, even though such
scrutiny has not proved to be an efficient technique for controlling
rulemaking.
Those who argue for a general legislative veto in the United States
136. Senator Abourezk has stated that in 1974 there were 428 new rules and proposed rules,
and 8,686 amendments and proposed amendments. In 1975 the figures were 486 and 9,861
respectively. Abourezk, supra note 17, at 323.
137. K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 245-47 (6th ed. 1977); Newman, Government and
Ignorance-A Progress Report on Publication of Federal Regulations, 63 HARV. L. REv. 929,
944 (1950); Note, The FederalRegister andthe Code of Federal Regulations-A Reappraisal, 80
HARV. L. REV. 439 (1966).
138. See Bruff& Gellhorn, supra note 4, at 1414-16, 1423-24, 1427-28; Watson, supra note
11, at 1073.
139. See, e.g., Schubert, supra note 134; F. HEADY, ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE LEGIS-
LATION IN THE STATES 49-62 (1952).
140. Bruff & Gellhorn, supra note 4, at 1415-16.
141. H.C. 475, supra note 5, Minutes of Evidence, at 47-48, 64, 128-29. See also H.C. 588,
supra note 5, at ix-xi; id, ch. 3, para. 10; id, app. 22, paras. 18, 22.
142. Jones, "Oversight" Function of Congressional Standing Committees, 34 A.B.A.J. 1018
(1948); Galloway, The Operation of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, 46 AM. POL.
Sc. REV. 41 (1951).
143. See W. GELLHORN & C. BysE, supra note 71, at 109-22; Macmahon, Congressional
Oversight of Administratiorn The Power of the Purse-Il, 58 POL. Sci. Q. 380 (1943).
144. See E.C.S. WADE & G. PHILLIPS, supra note 9, at 195-97; H.C. 588, supra note 5
(radical reforms suggested by the Select Committee on Procedure).
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recognize that Congress is unlikely to want to review the majority of non-
controversial rules, 145 but they overlook the fact that "if in practice Con-
gress does not exercise the veto power assiduously, the broader delegations
of authority which it fosters may result, contrary to expectations, in a net
decrease in control over agency discretion."' 46 The very small number of
debates in the House of Commons and the fact that they often occur before
a rule has been considered by the Scrutiny Committee' 47 illustrate this
point.
It is also important to allow sufficient time for legislators to inform
themselves of the issues involved. Without such a period there is a danger
that they will not take any interest and leave themselves open to manipula-
tion by administrators. 148 For this reason the suggestion 149 that legislative
vetoes should be seen as analogous to the President's duty to approve or
veto statutes within ten days must be rejected. The British experience di-
rectly contradicts the view that the problems of haphazard control will be
resolved by strictly limiting the period available for control.
Finally, the notice and comment procedures imposed by the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act 150 and other statutes form one of the cornerstones of
administrative law in the United States. Whether or not one agrees with
Professor K.C. Davis that these procedures are "one of the greatest inven-
tions of modern government,"' 5'1 it appears that they avoid many of the
defects of legislative scrutiny of rulemaking. First, they provide a more
efficient method of control in that they take place before rules are drafted
and at a time when administrators are more likely to be sensitive to the
opinions of others. Second, the procedures provide sufficient time for legis-
lators to inform themselves of the issues involved and thus minimize the
probability of inertia.
These factors suggest that, despite a tendency of courts to over-
judicialize, 15 2 rulemaking procedures are a more effective method of con-
trol than the legislative veto.' 5 3 The veto may be useful where rulemaking
145. House Hearings, supra note 4, at 146 (only a few of the numerous rules promulgated
by the bureaucracy "will require close scrutiny by Congress").
146. Bruff & Gellhorn, supra note 4, at 1424. See also id at 1379-80, 1437-38.
147. See text accompanying notes 89-94 supra.
148. See notes 68, 71-72, 95 & 110-11 supra and accompanying text; Bruff & Gellhorn,
supra note 4, at 1388, 1393-95, 1414.
149. Professor Arthur Miller and George Knapp have made this suggestion. Miller &
Knapp, supra note 17, at 394.
150. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1976).
151. K. DAVIs, supra note 137, at 241.
152. Eg., Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Interna-
tional Harvester Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
153. For the concern for prepromulgation notice when EEC rules are scrutinized, see note
97 supra and accompanying text. The very existence of legislative scrutiny might inhibit other,
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procedures do not exist, but where they do the existence of a legislative veto
as well may undermine their effectiveness and subject administrators to un-
desirable influences. 154
CONCLUSION
The experience of the British system of legislative control of rule-
making does not support the suggestion made in 1955 by Professor
Schwartz that "it would be most worthwhile to attempt the importation of
the essentials of the English techniques of Parliamentary control .. par-
ticularly those of laying subject to legislative annulment and the aiding of
the legislature itself by a select scrutinizing committee."' 155 Professor
Schwartz rejected the conclusion of the U.S. Attorney General's Committee
on Administrative Procedure that general legislative review of administra-
tive regulations "has not been effective where tried"'156 on the grounds that
the committee's report was unsupported by evidence, that "most observers
of the English system would strongly disagree" with it, and that the report
predated the establishment of the Scrutiny Committee and therefore did not
consider it.157
It is submitted that the recent reports of the Joint Scrutiny Committee,
the Joint Committee on Delegated Legislation, and the Select Committee
on Procedure provide the missing evidence.' 58 Events have shown that the
confidence displayed by Professor Schwartz and Sir Cecil Carr 159 in the
British system was misplaced. The restrictions on time for debate, in partic-
ular the "11:30 rule," and the shortness of the time period for scrutiny have
always been major problems, but they appear to have been overlooked by
both writers. The limited jurisdiction of the British Scrutiny Committee
potentially more effective methods of control, such as judicial review. The fact that British
courts in some cases, contrary to principle, have hesitated to review any rule that has been
approved by Parliament evidences this. See F. Hoffman-La Roche & Co. v. Secretary of State
of Trade and Indus., [1975] 1 A.C. 295, 316-17, 321-23 (C.A.) (Lord Denning M.R. and Buck-
ley L.J.) (an order made by statutory instrument acquires the status of an act of Parliament if
approved by resolution of both Houses). The House of Lords refused to adhere to this hetero-
dox view, [1975] 1 A.C. at 349, 354, 365, 372. See Wallington, Natural Justice and Delegated
Legislation, 33 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 26, 30-31 (1974); 90 LAW Q. REV. 436, 439 (1974). See also
McEldowney v. Forde, [19711 A.C. 632, 648-49 (Lord Guest). For a critical discussion of this
case, see MacCormick, Delegated Legislation and Civil Liberty, 86 LAW Q. REv. 171 (1970).
For the position in the United States, see Bruff & Gellhorn, supra note 4, at 1429-33.
154. Bruff& Gellhorn, supra note 4, at 1412-14.
155. Schwartz, supra note 3, at 1035.
156. ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE IN GOVERNMENT AGENCIES, supra note 1, at 120.
157. Schwartz, supra note 3, at 1035.
158. See authorities cited in note 5 supra; H.C. 169, supra note 6.
159. See Carr, supra note 2.
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was noted with apparent approval,' 60 but in fact the artificial separation of
merits from technical issues has substantially impeded the effectiveness of
the British legislative veto. The continued pressure for reform of the sys-
tem, which led to the establishment of the new Joint Scrutiny Committee
and the Merits Committee, among other innovations, gives some indication
of the problems with the system. Moreover, the latest reports from the Joint
Scrutiny Committee and the Select Committee on Procedure' 61 suggest that
despite the recent reforms the defects have not been cured.
The British experience clearly demonstrates that legislative control of
rulemaking is rarely effective in resolving issues of policy 162 and that there
is little interest in legislative scrutiny, especially of technical defects.' 63 If
vetoes are to be used at all, they should be used only where they are likely
to be effective. The evidence, both in the United States and in Britain, sug-
gests that they may be effective where the resolution of politically sensitive
issues has been left to rulemaking. 64 Where used as a general technique
for controlling administrators, the defects of the legislative veto outweigh its
perceived advantages.
160. Id at 1051.
161. H.C. 169, supra note 6; H.C. 588, supra note 5; see text accompanying notes 89 & 120
supra.
162. See, e.g., note 80 supra and accompanying text. The Bruff and Gellhorn study sug-
gests that this is true even where legislators take an interest in the operation of the legislative
veto. Because the veto is negative in its impact, any disagreement between the legislature and
administrators will leave a policy vacuum. Bruff & Gellhorhi, supra note 4, at 1428.
163. See notes 109-21 supra and accompanying text; Bruff & Gellhorn, supra note 4, at
1429-33.
164. See notes 77 & 126-29 supra, notes 126-29 supra and accompanying text.
